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[Of the English poor laws] Instead of making the poor rich, they 
are calculated to make the rich poor….The principle of gravitation 
is not more certain than the tendency of such laws to change wealth 
and power into misery and weakness. 
 








The English Old Poor Law, which before 1834 provided welfare 
to the elderly, children, the improvident, and the unfortunate, was 
a bête noire of the new discipline of Political Economy.  Smith, 
Bentham, Malthus and Ricardo all demanded its abolition.  The 
Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834, drafted by Political Economists, 
cut payments sharply.  Because local rules on eligibility and 
provision varied greatly before the 1834 reform, we can estimate 
the social cost of the extensive welfare provision of the Old Poor 
Law.  Surprisingly there is no evidence of any of the alleged social 
costs that prompted the harsh treatment of the poor after 1834.  




                                                 
2 David Ricardo, 1919, 83, 86.     3
Introduction 
 
Until 1834 England operated an extensive welfare system.  This guaranteed 
subsistence to all, provided mainly as cash payments to the elderly, widows, 
working families with many children, the sick, the disabled, and the unemployed.  
More than 9 percent of people in England were in receipt of such relief yearly 
between the 1790s and 1834.
3   
 
  Smith, Bentham, Malthus and Ricardo all denounced this system.
4  In their 
writings they complain it reduced the poor’s incentives to work and save.  It 
discouraged investment in high unemployment locations by taxing local 
employers.  It impeded labor mobility out of impoverished areas.  It increased the 
fertility of the poor and unemployed by subsidizing children.  In summary it 
“demoralized the working class, promoted population growth, lowered wages, 
reduced rents”




  Before the triumph of free trade in the 1846, the first great achievement of 
the new school of Political Economy in England was the 1834 Poor Law reform.  
The 1834 Poor Law Commission Report, the reform manifesto, was written by Edwin 
Chadwick, Bentham’s former secretary, and Nassau Senior, the first professor of 
Political Economy at Oxford.   The Commission’s Report prompted the radical 
reform of 1834, The Poor Law Amendment Act - the mother of all welfare reforms.   
 
The legal right to support was maintained, but welfare payments were to be 
made unattractive to all but the destitute.  Welfare would be received under strict 
supervision in a workhouse.  Thus was born the Victorian workhouse, 
                                                 
3 This was the share of the population that received payments at some point in each of 
the year 1813-5. 
4 Smith, 1776, Bentham 2001, Malthus, 1970, Ricardo, 1919, 82-6.  
5 Blaug, 1963, 151. 
6 On Sweden, see for example, Lindbeck, 1997.   4
immortalized by Charles Dickens in Oliver Twist.  These reforms were only 
partially implemented.  By 1842, for example, only 16 percent of relief recipients 
had been forced into the workhouse.
7   But real payments per capita declined 40 
percent between 1833 and 1838.  Since workhouse provision of relief cost much 
more than traditional cash welfare payments, real benefits per person fell by 
nearly 50 percent.
8   
 
The reforms replaced a local system of welfare provision, with idiosyncratic 
payments and eligibility by parish, with uniform national rules.  This entailed that 
the brunt of the reform was borne by 1842 by a minority of parishes.  We 
measure whether the 1834 reforms produced social gains by comparing land 
rents, wages and population changes in parishes before and after the reform, 
according to the magnitude of the cuts.  Were the losses to the poor from the 
welfare reduction more than compensated by gains in wages, land rents, and labor 
mobility?  We find that changes in rents, wages and parish populations all indicate 
that the earlier system had no social costs.  The first and most dramatic of all 
welfare reforms thus delivered none of the gains promised by Political Economy.  
The social costs of maintaining an extensive system of social support turned out 
to be modest.   
 
The 1834 reforms were similar in character, though more extreme, than 
recent US reforms.  There are conflicting views of the incentive effects of the 
current welfare systems.  We identify two features of the pre-1834 English system 
that avoided significant social costs.  First local employers adjusted their hiring 
practices to take advantage of the welfare subsidy.  Secondly because welfare 
payments were raised locally tax payers had an incentive to pay the costs of 
relocating the poor to where they would be most productively employed. 
                                                 
7 Over the course of the nineteenth century increasing proportions of relief recipients 
were in workhouses.  The workhouse itself was not abolished in England until 1929. 
8 In 1842 the cost per workhouse relief recipient was 63 percent greater than for outdoor 
recipients (Statistical Society, 1843, 256).     5
Welfare before 1834 
  
From 1601 anyone in England unable to earn their subsistence had a legal 
right to support from their parish.  Each of the 15,000 parishes and townships in 
turn had the right to levy a local rate on the occupiers of property to fund these 
payments to the poor.  The administration of relief in each parish was controlled 




  The Old Poor Law thus mixed a national right to relief, with local setting of 
eligibility and relief levels. Support levels varied substantially by district.  Thus in 
1832-3 the payment guaranteed to a family of a husband, wife and three children 
varied from 6 to 14 s. per week across 337 parishes whose payments were 
recorded in the Poor Law Commission Report. 
 
  In more generous parishes workers received support when they were too old 
to work, when they were ill, when they were unable to find work, and when their 
earnings fell below the adjudged subsistence level for their family.   Thus in 
Todenham in 1832-3 those in receipt of poor relief were: 
 
“eight efficient Labourers with four Children and upwards, 14s. 8d.; three 
infirm old Men, 9s. 6d.; three Bastards, 5s. 8d.; eleven Widows, £1. 8. 5.; 
three with Families, £1. 0. 9.”  (Parliamentary Papers, 1834b, p. 
202b). 
 
                                                 
9 The vestry was the parish council.  Up until 1834 local magistrates, with jurisdiction 
over groups of parishes, adjudicated if the parish denied relief to an applicant and set the 
level of relief that had to be offered.  Thus in the parish of Ardleigh, in Essex, in 1795 
the overseer’s account book notes “Relieved John Lilly on complaint by order, 5 s.” 
(Essex Record Office, Overseers Accounts, D/P 263/12/1)  
   6
The allowance paid to employed laborers in Todenham was calculated as the 
difference between their wage and their family need, where this was measured as 
15 d. per family member, plus 30 d. extra for the husband and wife. 
 
  Although parishes were required to provide subsistence, they could choose 
how it was provided.  Some of the poor, typically the old, the infirm, and 
children, were accommodated in Poor Houses.  But the great majority were 
maintained in their own homes with weekly stipends and rent and clothing 
subsidies, as in most modern welfare systems.  Many families received a weekly 
cash allowance from the Overseers of the Poor. 
 
Wage subsidies were very common in many parishes by the early nineteenth 
century.  In 81 out of 261 rural parishes surveyed in 1832-3 the subsistence level 
set for a family with three young children equaled or exceeded the wage outside 
harvest for farm laborers.  By the early nineteenth century 9 percent of the 
English population was in receipt of relief at some point in the year.  But in rural 
southern England the fraction receiving relief was even higher: 13 percent or 
more in 1813-15.   
 
Poor relief payments per person varied widely across parishes under the Old 
Poor Law.  At one extreme, in Ardleigh in Essex, detailed poor relief expenditures 
and population figures for 1821-23 show 28 percent of the population were in 
families in regular receipt of relief in 1823.  22 percent of males aged 15-59 
received unemployment payments at some point in the year 1821.
10  Elsewhere 
there were parishes where no-one received relief.  
 
Figure 1 shows payments per person in 1829-33 by parish.  The average was 
£0.8 per person. Since average wage income per person was about £8 per year per 
person for laboring families, poor relief payments averaged more than 10 percent  
  
                                                 
10 Essex Record Office, Overseers Accounts, D/P 263/12/7-8, Census Returns 1821, 
D/P 263/28/1.   7









of laboring families’ budgets.  But in 5 percent of parishes payments were more 
than twice this average, and in 17 percent of parishes less than half. 
  
Using 787 parishes where we have information on wages and relief systems 
in 1832 from the Poor Law Commission Report we explored the source of this 
variation with the following regression: 
 
3 4 6 10 9 8 7 6 5
1831 4 1837 3 1831 2 1832 1 33 1829
CHILD b CHILD b CHILD b DSW b DSE b DN b
LDEN b FARA b FLABAG b W b a PPN
+ + + + +
+ + + + + = −
(1) 
   8
W1832 is the estimated annual wage in farming in the parish in 1832.  FLABAG is 
the fraction of men aged 21 and over engaged in farming.  FARA is the fraction 
of parish farmland employed in arable farming in 1837.  LDEN1831 is the 
logarithm of people per acre in 1831.  DN an indicator for parishes located in 
northern England, DSE an indicator for parishes in the southeast, and DSW an 
indicator for parishes in the southwest (with the Midlands the omitted category).
11   
 
From the Poor Law Report we categorize parishes into those that allowed no 
support to employed men with children (41 percent), those that gave support to 
employed men with 3 or even fewer children (CHILD3 - 15 percent), those where 
support started with the fourth or fifth child (CHILD4 – 29 percent), and those 
that only gave support to employed men with 6 or more children, or allowed 
support in an unspecified way to “large families” (CHILD6 – 15 percent).
12 
 
The variables in the regression explain 48 percent of the variation in poor 
payments per person across parishes.  Most of that explained variation came from 
practices with respect to paying child allowances and from the location of the 
parish.  The child allowance indictors alone own explain 24 percent of the 
variation.  Child allowance plus regional indictors explains 39 percent of the 
variation.  If we use fixed effects for each of the 42 counties in England rather 
than just the four regional fixed effects, then this along with child allowance 
practices, explains 48 percent of the variation.  Indeed restricting ourselves to the 
parishes where the majority of men were employed agriculture, which we will use 
in the empirical tests below, location and welfare rules alone explained 53 percent 
of the variation in poor payments.  Adding all the other variables to the regression 
improves explained variation by only 3 percent.    
                                                 
11 The fraction of the land employed in arable cultivation comes from the tithe surveys 
carried out in parishes mainly in the years 1837-1845.  Only for 35 percent of parishes do 
we have this fraction directly.  For the rest we estimate it as the average of the county the 
parish was in (there were 42 counties). 
12 Where child allowance was allowed just for “large families” without a specific rule it was 
often stated or implied that this was an infrequent occurrence.   9















Farm Wage 1832 (£/year)  -0.004  0.003 
Fraction of males in agriculture  0.414**  0.075 
Fraction acreage arable  0.030  0.078 
Log Population density  -0.043*  0.019 
North -0.249**  0.037 
South East  0.161**  0.028 
South West  -0.207**  0.036 
Child Allowance 6+  0.077*  0.031 
Child Allowance 4-5  0.203**  0.027 




Note: ** indicates statistically significant at the 1 percent level, * significant at the 




Thus the most important component in explaining variations in poor 
payments per head seems just to have been differences in parish and regional 
“tastes” for providing welfare payments, rather than labor demand (as indexed by 
wage levels), or the type of agriculture.
13  Higher wages had a very modest 
association with the level of poor payments.  Going from the lowest annual wages 
of £19 to the highest of £46 reduced predicted poor payments per head by £0.11, 
much less than the differences induced by regional and local welfare tastes.  Since 
the average poor payment per person was £0.8, the predicted difference of £0.75 
between a northern parish without child allowances, and a south eastern parish 
paying the most generous child allowance was very substantial.   
  
                                                 
13 King, 2000, makes the argument that there were regional differences in attitudes to 
welfare that created these different expenditures.   10
The 1834 Poor Law Report 
 
The Old Poor Law was argued by the Poor Law Commission Report to have 
four significant social costs. 
 
Reduced Work Incentives - The poor law allegedly destroyed the incentive 
of workers to work hard at work, and to seek out employment if they were 
unemployed.  In a parish where the market wage rate for a worker was below the 
guaranteed minimum, the worker faced effectively a 100 percent marginal tax rate.  
This should have reduced work effort since unemployment costs were lowered.  
The commissioners concluded this would lower market wages.
14 
 
  Figure 2 shows for 261 parishes or townships in 1832-3 both the reported 
weekly wage in winter for an adult male in agriculture, and the level of income at 
which the parish would start supporting a family of husband, wife and 3 young 
children.  On average that subsistence allowance for men with families was 93 
percent of the winter wage, and in 24 percent of cases it exceeded the winter 
wage.  The report concluded 
 
We have seen that in every instance in which the able-bodied labourers have been 
rendered independent of partial relief, or of relief otherwise than in a well-regulated 
workhouse -    
1. Their industry has been restored and improved.  
2. Frugal habits have been created or strengthened.  
3. The permanent demand for their labour has increased.  
4. And the increase has been such, that their wages, so far from being depressed by 




                                                 
14 The logic of the commissioners argument has been criticized.  See, for example, McCloskey, 
1973. 
15 Parliamentary Papers, 1834a, 146.   11
Figure 2:  Winter Wages versus the Subsistence Allowance, 1832-3 
 
 
Note:  “n” indicates a parish in the north, “s” a parish elsewhere.   
 
 
    
Reduced Labor Mobility - Since workers were guaranteed a subsistence 
income in their place of birth they had reduced incentives to bear the costs and 
hazards of moving in response to higher wage opportunities in the cities, or in 
other parishes.  Thus poor relief impeded labor mobility.  Figure 3 shows annual 
agricultural wages in 1832 in parishes within 60 miles of London in the south of 
England, as well as the annual wage of a building laborer in London (£51).   The 
average wage in these parishes was less than £32.  Housing was much more 
expensive in London, but even taking this into account, the real wage in London 
substantially exceeded that in nearby rural areas.  There were parishes less than 50  
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miles from London where the annual wage was below £20.  The poor relief 
system was retarding labor mobility to high wage opportunities. 
 
Reduced Investment - The Old Poor Law reduced landowners’ incentive to 
invest capital in land improvement.  Poor relief was paid out of parish taxes 
assessed on the estimated rental value of property. Land value was partly 
determined by soil fertility, but it also strongly depended on investments in 
farmhouses, buildings, roads, fences, drainage and soil amendment.  The tax rate 
on property under the Old Poor Law was as high as 40 percent in some rural 






























improvement would be correspondingly greater.  Thus the Old Poor Law reduced 
rural labor demand by discouraging investment. 
 
Increased Fertility by the Poor  -  In many parishes each additional child 
beyond some established minimum – 2, 3, 4, 5, or more - received a 
proportionate allowance from the poor rates. It was feared that precisely for the 
poorest of the population, relief recipients, the normal economic costs of greater 
fertility had been taken away.  Where for richer groups earlier marriage implied 
more children and a substantial decline in living standards, for the poor earlier 
marriage had no costs.  Fertility would be increased most precisely in those areas 
with the least demand for labor.  And fertility would increase for those with the 
least education and prospects. 
 
 
The 1834 Reform 
 
 The  Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 enacted radical reforms.  The legal right 
to relief was maintained, but now able-bodied relief applicants were expected to 
enter a workhouse to receive it.  In the workhouse, the conditions were 
deliberately planned to be wholesome but monotonous and confining.  This was 
the so-called “Workhouse Test.”  There was to be no payment to relief to those 
living independently or as a subsidy to wages, except on a temporary basis in the 
case of illness.  Indoor relief was more expensive than outdoor, but the hope was 
that the new regime would discourage all but the truly needy from applying.   
Workers would instead migrate in search of work, limit fertility (through delaying 
marriage), or make do with what the market offered.
16 
 
To ensure compliance with the reform objectives at the local level, parishes 
were grouped into unions, where the decision about who was entitled to relief, 
                                                 
16 Besley and Coates, 1992, set out a micro-theoretic conditions which would underpin this 
approach.   14
and how much relief to provide, was now to lie with the Board of Guardians of 
the union.  The Board of Guardians was composed of the magistrates resident in 
the Union, along with an elected representative from each parish.  In the election 
for the guardians, however, large occupiers and large landowners were given more 
votes.   Though the 1834 reform was not immediately implemented in all its 
rigor – there were not sufficient workhouse places and there was significant local 
opposition to the measures – it did lead to a sharp reduction in poor relief.    
 
In the years before the reform there is a strong correlation between the 
places with high payments in 1829-33 and those with high payments in 1824-8, 
with little sign of regression to the mean.  The payment pattern across parishes 
was stable, as figure 4 shows.  After the reform the payment pattern is largely 
unchanged for parishes with payments per head of population of less than £0.60: 
average payments per head fell from £0.42 to £0.40.  But in the higher paying 
parishes there is a clear pattern of cuts.  The higher the payment the greater the 
proportionate cut.  Parishes paying more than £0.60 per year saw a decline in 
average payments from £1.07 to £0.68.  Thus the reforms imposed real cuts, and 
imposed them in the areas of highest relief payments per head.
17   
 
Our interpretation is that in low payment parishes payments before 1834 
were principally to the elderly, widows and orphans, and were unaffected by the 
strictures of the New Poor Law.  The areas of high payments per capita were 
those with wage subsidies in support of children, and thus were cut.  The effects 
found in aggregate also show up if we divide the data into four regions, the 
North, the Midlands, the South West and the South East.  Payments fell most 
where they had been highest.  In rural parishes in the South West average poor 
payments per head fell from £0.62 to £0.58.  In the South East average payments 
fell from £1.09 to £0.73. 
                                                 
17 We include the 1824-28 data to show that the relationship between the payments in 
1829-33 and 1838-41 cannot be just the result of larger random components in the 
higher paying parishes in 1829-33.  If so the curve relating 1824-28 payments to 1829-33 
would show a similar regression to the mean.   15
 






Note:  The figure shows on the horizontal axis average poor payments per head 
in 1829-33 by 0.1 increments.  It shows on the vertical axis the average payment 















































We can explain 58 percent of the variance in the change in poor payments 
per head by parish or township between 1829-33 and 1838-41 (ΔPPN) with the 
simple regression specification 
  
ΔPPN  =  β0 + β1PPN1829-33 + β2DHIGH•(PPN1829-33 - 0.5) + ε       (2) 
 
where PPN1829-33 is the poor relief payments per resident in 1829-33, and DHIGH 
is an indicator variable which is 1 when PPN1829-33 ≥ 0.5.  In contrast if we look at 
the changes under the Old Poor Law regime between 1824-28 and 1829-33, then 
the same specification explains just 8 percent of the variance.  Thus the regime 
change alone explains at least half of the changes in poor payments per head 
between 1829-33 and 1838-41.
18 
 
In the tests of the effects of the poor law reform below we will be using as an 
independent variable poor payments per acre in rural parishes, defined as those 
with the majority of workers employed in agriculture.  Changes in poor payments 
per acre in rural parishes are even more predictable than changes in poor 
payments per head.  If we translate the equation above into poor payments per 
acre by multiplying every term by people per acre in 1831, then we can explain 68 
percent of the variance in changes in poor payments per acre between 1829-33 
and 1838-41.






                                                 
18 Addition of other variables such as indicator variables for local effects, for urban 
versus rural parishes, and for the poor law union the parish belonged to can raise the R2 
to 0.64.  But this implies that these other elements explain only a very small share of the 
variance.  
19 Again looking at the change from 1829-30 to 1831-33 the same variables explain only 2 
percent of the variance across time periods in poor payments per acre.   17
Social Gains from the Reform? 
 
  The Poor Law Commissioners optimistically expected that in parishes with 
high welfare payments reform would raise wages, raise land rents by more than 
the decrease in the tax, and reduce fertility by the poor.  It would also increase 
labor mobility.  Can we detect any of the anticipated social gains from the reform?  
Below we estimate the effects of the cuts on land rents, wages, and (in 
combination) fertility and labor mobility. 
 
Poor relief payments were paid through taxes on property.  Did property 
owners benefit significantly from the reforms?  For this test we concentrate on 
rural parishes where most of the poor were concentrated.  In these parishes the 
main payment for the law came from a tax on land.  To estimate the gains by 
landowners we assume that the farmland rent per acre in each parish i with poor 
payments of 0 would be in year t, Vt +  εit.  When a poor rate is charged the actual 
rent per acre becomes 
 
   RENTit  =  Vt  -  b•POORit  +  εit        (3) 
 
The change in rent between the earlier period and 1842 is thus 
  
   ΔRENTi  =  ΔVi  -  b•ΔPOORi  +  Δεi       (4) 
 
ΔPOOR measures the change in the tax per acre on farmland in each parish 
between the two periods.  ΔVi  is assumed to be a constant, ΔV.  b measures the 
fraction of the reduction in the tax rate which gets translated into higher rental 
values for land owners.  If poor payments were just a transfer to the needy from 
landowners, with no effects on investment, wages, or labor efficiency, then 
changes in wages and property values net of the tax will be zero, and the estimate 
of b will be 1.   
   18
  The Poor Law Commission interpretation, however, was that poor relief was 
reducing investment in land improvement by driving up the cost of capital, and 
raising the effective cost of labor.   In this case when we estimate (4) we will find 
b > 1.  For b will pick up also gains in property values after reform from the lower 
real labor cost and the greater investment in land improvement. 
 
  The estimation of b from (4) will be a biased estimate of the total effects of 
poor relief reforms on land rents if the changes in poor relief payments were 
partially endogenous.  This bias could go in either direction.  Suppose, for 
example, poor relief payments declined more in 1829-33 to 1838-41 in parishes 
close to growing urban areas because of a more buoyant demand for labor.  The 
growing urban areas would also increase farmland rents.  In this case the 
estimated value of b will be biased upwards from the true value.  Alternatively 
suppose that some parishes had faster population growth for reasons independent 
of welfare provision, such as a better health environment or accidents of 
demography.  The enhanced labor supply would drive down wages, and drive up 
land rents.  But if the decline in wages was accompanied by more poor relief 
payments, it would bias the estimate of b downwards towards 0. 
 
We control for this endogeneity by using an instrument for the change in 
poor rate payments per acre 1829-33 to 1838-41.  That instrument, based on 
figure 4, is just the predicted change in poor payments per unit of rent in a parish 
based on the level of those payments per person in 1829-33.  Since the instrument 
depends only on features of the parish before the cuts in welfare payments it is 
purged of any endogenous connection between changes in rents and changes in 




                                                 
20 To be a valid instrument the level of poor payments per head before the reform also 
must have no direct effect on the change in rent.  We demonstrate in table 1 above that 
these payments were largely determined by local tastes for welfare, which we expect are 
unconnected directly with subsequent changes in the rental values of farmland.   19

































































County  Dummies  NO  NO YES NO NO YES 
         
Number of parishes  2,207  2,207  2,207  2,207  2,207  2,207 




Table 3 shows the results of estimating equation (4) using both Ordinary 
Least Squares and Instrumental Variables.  We include also two control variables 
in the regression.  A transition occurring in English agriculture throughout this 
period was the conversion of land from partially common ownership to pure 
private status.  This change was accompanied by rent increases per acre.  We 
know the fraction of land that was still common land in parishes in 1842.  We 
know also the fraction of the plots that was used for the earlier rent estimate that 
was common. Thus we can construct a measure of the change in the fraction of 
private land between our estimates for these two dates.  This variable is included 
as a test of whether rents were indeed responsive to the economic value of land 
even over this short period, and whether our measured change in rent indeed 
contains information about changing land values.  We know the magnitude of this   20
coefficient should be around 0.3 for this period based on earlier work on the 
gains from enclosure of common land in this period.
21   
 
We also include measures of population density in 1831.  This controls for 
differential rent trends in more urbanized parishes and more fertile land.  But as is 
discussed in the data appendix there will be errors in the measurement of the rent 
change in parishes post reform that are correlated with parish population 
densities.  Rural parishes with low population densities will tend to have an 
underestimate of the true rental value of farmland after the reform, and hence an 
underestimate of rent gains.  Low population density parishes do indeed show 
lower rent gains in the estimations in table 3.  
 
  The main result that emerges is that cuts in poor rate payments produced 
surprisingly little gain in land rental values.  The effects are greater with the 
instrumental variable estimates.  But even there we estimate each £1 saved in 
poor rate payments increased rents by only £0.24-0.41.  We can rule out with 
confidence the idea that poor rate payments imposed any significant burden on 
rents above the actual amount collected.  If the Old Poor Law was causing 
substantial inefficiencies they were not showing as losses to land owners.  If there 
were substantial efficiency costs it would have to be in wage losses to workers. 
 
  Could our failure to find much gain in rents from the reform stem just from 
very poor measures of rents, so that the left hand side of equation (4) is just 
noise?   This can be ruled out in two ways.  First if either the pre or post rent 
measures was just noise then the two sets of measures would be uncorrelated.  
However, if we regress the average rental value per acre of holdings in the years 
1820-1834 (rent20-34) in the sample of rural parishes on the rental value per acre of 
the parish as a whole in 1842 (rent42) the estimate is 
 
 
                                                 
21 Clark, 1998, 88.   21
Rent20-34  = 1.011       +    0.560rent42 
    (.047)   (.031)      R
2  =  0.13      (5) 
 
There thus information in our measure on rent changes by parish from pre-
reform to post-reform.  Secondly we do detect very clearly the gains from land 
switching from common to private control over the same interval.  The 
magnitude of this effect is even stronger than that found in Clark (1998), and is 
highly significant statistically.    
 
 
Reform, Fertility and Labor Mobility 
 
  Two other potential costs of the Old Poor Law alleged by the Poor Law 
Commission were its implicit subsidy to fertility among the poorest, and the 
distortion of the labor markets it created by subsidizing workers who stayed in 
low wage parishes.  
 
Parishes with the highest payments typically had child allowances that 
supported all additional dependent children beyond a specified minimum from 
the public purse.  Malthus, one of the great critics of the Old Poor Law, referred 
to these subsidies as “a direct, constant, and systematic encouragement to 
marriage.”
22  The Poor Law Report envisioned the Old Poor Law as multiplying the 
population in precisely those parishes where there was little demand for labor.  
But at the same time by paying workers allowances above the market wage level 
the Old Poor Law impeded the movement of that labor to parishes where its 
marginal product was higher by subsidizing the poor to stay where they were 
born.   
 
Even if there was no impediment to labor mobility, we would from the Poor 
Law Commissioners Report expect more children per employed laborer in parishes 
                                                 
22 Quoted in Boyer, 1989, 94.     22
with generous welfare in 1834 from earlier and more frequent marriage, and 
hence greater population densities.  It has been debated ever since whether indeed 
the Old Poor Law stimulated fertility.  James Huzel looking at a time series of 
parishes before and after elimination of child allowances in the 1820s under the 
Old Poor Law finds no evidence of a positive effect of child allowances on 
fertility.
23  However, Huzel’s study had no controls for the potential endogeneity 
of the decision to end allowances.  George Boyer looking at a cross section of 214 
parishes in 1832 finds that the generosity of child allowances correlated positively 
in cross section with the birth rate under the Old Poor Law.  Parishes giving a 
child allowance for the third and higher children reporting birth rates 25 percent 
greater than those with no child allowance.
24   
 
 In 1831 with the high fertility levels of this period, those under age 20 were 
50 percent of the population of rural parishes.  If child allowances stimulated 
fertility in the way expected from Boyer’s study we would expect noticeably 
higher population densities in rural parishes with high levels of poor relief.  In 
fact the estimation in table 1 suggests that rural parishes with high poor payments 
tended to be less densely populated in 1831.  But many other variables can 
intervene in such a cross section, obscuring the true relationship.  
 
 If  the  Poor Law Commissioners Report was correct, however, then the end of 
child allowances, and the tightening of general conditions of relief after 1834, 
should have led to a relative decline in population in rural parishes with previously 
generous benefits.  First the number of dependents per employed laborer should 
drop in these parishes between 1831 and 1841, as laborers delayed marriage, or 
reduced fertility within marriage.  Second labor would migrate away from parishes 
where workers no longer received a supplement to their wages. 
 
                                                 
23 Huzel, 1980, 369-75. 
24 Boyer, 1989, 105.  Boyer controls in his estimations for such things as the income of 
laborers, and the availability of housing and other income sources.   23
To test whether jointly the Old Poor Law increased fertility and reduced 
emigration we estimate the parameters of the expression 
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31 41      (6) 
 
where N31 and N41 are the parish populations in 1831 and 1841, and PPN are poor 
payments per head of population.  It is not possible with this data to disentangle 
the effects of enhanced out-migration with those of potential fertility reductions 
from delayed marriages.  Instead we will see a combined effect.  How did 
population change in parishes with large welfare cuts compared to those with no 
cut?  If the Poor Law Commission Report was correct, we would expect to see b 
be positive and large.  
 
Population rose by on average 8 percent between 1831 and 1841 in the 
predominantly rural parishes in our sample.  This is much less than for England 
as a whole.  Since rural birth rates were higher than in urban parishes most rural 
parishes experienced significant out migration: 7 percent or more of their 
population over 10 years.
25  The average poor payment per head in 1829-33 was 
£0.8, more than 10 percent of the income of rural laboring families.  If these 
payments were increasing fertility or reducing out-migration, then we should be 
able to detect changes by 1841. 
 
  As with the change in rents, ΔPPN  is potentially endogenous.  Suppose 
parishes are subject to labor demand shocks in a way not controlled for by the 
CONTROL variables.  A parish which experienced a positive shock between 1833 
and 1841 could see both a decline in relief payments per head, and a larger than 
expected population relative to 1831.  We deal with this again by using as an 
instrument for ΔPPN the predicted change from payments per person in 1829-33.   
                                                 
25 We excluded parishes where less than 50 percent of males were employed in agriculture 
in 1831, and where the population in 1831 was less than 50 people.   24







































































- - 0.07** 
(.021) 




NO NO YES  NO NO YES 
Number of parishes  6.948  6,948  6,948  6,948  6,948  6,948 
        
 
Note:  ** indicates defers from 0 at the 1 percent level of statistical significance.  




  Table 4, reports OLS and IV estimates of the parameters of equation (6) 
linking population change to changes in poor payments per head.  With the OLS 
estimation there is a significant negative association between the change in poor 
relief payments per head and the population change.  This is because parishes 
where poor payments per head fell saw greater population growth.  Thus the 15 
percent of parishes where poor payments per head fell £0.5 or more had a 
population growth of 12 percent on average between 1831 and 1841.  But this   25
association came from unobserved shocks on labor demand that both increased 
population and reduced poor relief payments.  With the instrumental variable 
estimation this association disappears.  Poor payment cuts had no statistically 
significant association with population change from 1831 to 1841. 
 
  Indeed the best estimate from table 4 is that a reduction of poor payments in 
a parish equivalent to about 7.5 percent of annual wage income for all workers, 
the typical reduction in the South East, would lead to a decline in population 
between 1831 and 1841 of 0.65 percent.  Even at the 95 percent confidence limit 
the most the reform of the poor law could have reduced population in rural 
parishes by 1841 was by 0.9 percent, taking into account both changes in fertility 
and migration.  This is a tiny fraction of the observed average migration of more 
than 7 percent per decade.  Thus whether the population movements induced by 
the poor law reform were statistically significant or not, they had an imperceptible 
impact in England in 1834. 
 
  The population changes after the reform of the Old Poor Law are 
inconsistent with the law having large efficiency effects through misallocation of 
labor.  They are similarly inconsistent with the idea that the Old Poor Law 
induced significantly higher fertility in parishes with high payment levels.  In that 
case the seven years between the 1834 reform and the 1841 census there was 
plenty of time for the elimination of child subsidies to show up through delay or 




Reform and Wages 
 
  Landlords gained little from the reform, and perhaps not even as much as 
their reduced tax payments.  Fertility and labor allocation did not change.  But 
perhaps all the gains of the reform went to the poor themselves in the form of 
higher wages?          26

















      
1830-4 24.1  23.4  22.6  18.8 
        
1835-9 23.2  22.7  21.4  19.1 
1840-4 23.0  23.9  22.2  19.5 
























      
 
Source:  Clark, 2001.  These are male wages between October and May, outside 




  We have much less complete wage data for rural England in these years.  But 
what there is strongly suggests that rural labors did not make significant gains in 
wages as a result of these reforms.  Table 5 shows average nominal winter day 
wages in the four regions of England used above in each of the 5 year periods, 
1830-4, 1835-9, 1840-4 and 1845-9, from a sample of farm accounts in each of 
these regions.  Also shown is the change in average daily wages between 1830-4 
and 1835-49.  The last row of the table shows the implied cuts in welfare 
payments per worker per day of work in each region, on the assumption that 
adult male workers were 30 percent of the population, and that the low paid 
laborers who would receive welfare were on average half the labor force. 
   27
  As noted before the welfare cuts were concentrated in the south east.  There 
they would have constituted a decline of as much as 7 percent in the average 
income of the poorest workers.  Yet there is no sign that day wages in the south 
east adjusted to compensate for these cuts, or indeed that wages rose strongly in 
the south east as the labor market was freed up with the ending of many welfare 
payments.   The evidence of day wages suggests instead that the relative earnings 





  Clearly the 1834 welfare reform fulfilled none of the hopes of the Political 
Economists.  It is estimated that rents rose in parishes with the greatest reduction 
in welfare payments, but most likely by less than the reduction in poor rate taxes.  
Certainly there were no gains for landowners beyond the decline in their tax 
burden.  Labor did not migrate faster from rural parishes after the reforms, nor is 
there sign of any reduction in fertility.  The reform did not spur any observable 
increase in wages in the south east where payments were high through enhancing 
the discipline and efficiency of workers, and inducing greater capital investment.    
 
George Boyer has a political economy interpretation of the Old Poor Law 
that can explain some of these findings.  Boyer argued that the pre-1834 did not 
transfer income from property owners to the poor, but instead reallocated labor 
costs in rural parishes from farmers to non-labor hirers, such as house owners 
and the collectors of tithe payments from farmers.  It persisted because rural 
landlords, whose tenant farmers operated the poor relief system within parishes, 
were gaining from the payments.
26  Such farmers operated within a competitive 
labor market, and needed to pay enough to retain adequate labor in the 
countryside.  By laying-off workers when labor demand was low in winter, and 
                                                 
26Boyer, 1990.  Boyer considers the main loser from these transfers to be smallholders 
who did not hire labor, or house owners.  But the tithe collectors, who could get as much 
as 20 percent of the rental income in a parish, would also typically not hire labor locally.   28
having them supported by the parish, they reduced net labor costs since the 
occupiers of the houses and the tithe owners paid part of the poor relief.   
 
Boyer explains the geographic variation in relief payments under the Old 
Poor Law, noted above in table 1, as stemming from differences in the marginal 
product of labor in winter in different areas.  Payments were greater in the grain 
growing south east than in the equally poor but pastoral south west.  The grain 
growing areas have little demand for labor in winter.  Thus the farmers could at 
little cost lay off workers and have the parish support them in the winter 
months.
27  Similarly much higher rural than urban payments stem from these 
seasonal labor demands, as well as the political power of labor hirers in rural as 
opposed to urban areas. 
 
  On Boyer’s interpretation, where poor relief payments were mainly a 
replacement for wages, the reduced form estimate of b in equation (4) will actually 
be negative.  For if we assume that wages in each rural parish are set by the wage 
level in the nearest urban community, then the total of poor relief plus wage 
payments in each parish will not change after the reform.  Thus for every £1 of 
relief payments avoided wages have to be supplemented by a £1.  But since others 
were paying some of the taxes landowners end up paying an increased wage bill, 
and hence land rents fall.  Boyer would also predict no increase in wages to 
compensate for the reduction in poor relief payments, and no increased migration 
out of villages with high poor payments after the cuts. 
 
  However there are a number of facts of the period that do not fit with this 
political economy of the poor law.  As is shown below in table 6, even entirely 
urban parishes in the south east paid more relief per person in 1829-33 than 
urban parishes in the south west and north.  Poor payments per head in the most  
                                                 
27 Boyer’s primary empirical support for his theory is data on a cross section of parishes 
in 1832-3.   He shows that parishes with higher poor law payments were those with more 
seasonal labor demands, and also those with a larger proportion of ratepayers who were 
farmers.  Boyer, 1990.   29
 




















per head (£) 
  
South East  122  0.78  810  1.18 
Midlands 142 0.68 683 0.90 
North 340  0.25  330  0.77 
South West 
 
163 0.35 421  0.65 
 




urban parishes, those with fewer than one male in 10 employed in agriculture in 
1831, followed the same regional pattern as those in the most rural parishes, those 
with more than 8 in 10 males employed in agriculture.   
 
  Further if we refer back to the estimated coefficients from equation (1) we 
see values that are at odds with the Boyer theory.  Once we control for regional 
effects, parishes with more arable land and hence more seasonal employment 
demands do not spend more on poor relief.  Further the regression shows that an 
important source of high payment levels in parishes was the practice of making 
child support payments.  Since these were paid to employed workers, they would 
also act as a wage subsidy for farmers.  But they would subsidize farmers in all 
regions, not just those in the south east.  Yet such payments were much more 
common in the south east.  This conflicts with Boyer’s particular Political 
Economy story.  It is consistent with the idea of regional welfare cultures.
28   
 
                                                 
28 King, 2000.   30
One way to interpret this would be that farmers did not lobby for the 
particular welfare systems we observe, but they did respond to the local welfare 
culture in their own compensation to workers.  Where relief was generous they 
did not have to compensate the workers as well to keep them in the rural areas.   
 
Our data on winter day wages, which show no sign of adjusting after the end 
of the Old Poor Law, is discordant with this.  But there were other dimensions 
along which farmers could adjust labor compensation.  They could offer more 
days of employment per worker over the winter.  Varying amounts of work were 
offered at piece rates, which traditionally offered higher compensation per day.  
They could also offer more employment opportunities for wives and children.  
Thus it is possible that rents rose little after the reforms, and labor did not 
migrate from the countryside, because farmers had to raise labor payments to 
workers in compensation.   
 
But all this depends on the earlier system having modest efficiency costs.  
Given our description above of that system how was it possible not to have had 
such social costs?  A key element here was that it was the people operating the 
system at the local level who bore the costs.  As owners of land, or more 
frequently as tenants, any money they saved from reduced poor payments went 
directly to their pocket (though for tenants those savings would in a few years get 
transferred to the landlord in the form of higher rents when the next lease 
renewal came).  Within the constraints of the law, then, they had the incentive to 
operate the system as efficiently as possible. 
 
  Take the example of allowances paid in aid of wages.  Since the minimum 
subsistence income set for a man with three or more children frequently exceeded 
the going wage, the argument was that such payments must have severely 
undermined labor incentives, and so driven up real labor costs even beyond the 
amounts paid in poor rate taxes.  However, the detailed records of parishes like 
Ardleigh in Essex suggests that, well aware of the incentive issues, parishes would 
fix a standard allowance to be paid, independent of the actual earnings of the   31
family.  If the husband could earn more at work then he got to keep all of it.  The 
very pervasiveness of such payments reflected in part an attempt to avoid the 
incentive problems that would arise if industrious workers lost out as a result of 
their industry.  
 
  Similarly the lack of any increased emigration out of parishes with high poor 
rate payments after the cuts reflects the fact that local parishes before the reform 
were legally entitled to use the poor rate to pay the costs of emigration for 
families.  If rural parishes had surplus workers who could productivity be 
employed elsewhere, parishes had a financial incentive to pay the costs of their 
relocation.  Even before the reform of 1834 there were some such schemes 
organized by groups of parishes.  One of the provisions of the New Poor Law 
was an explicit authorization for parishes to subsidize the foreign immigration of 
their poor.  In 1836-1852 English parishes, for example, paid for the emigration 
of paupers to Australia.  Yet the numbers involved were very modest in 
proportion to the total rural population.  And in 1852 Australia refused to accept 






  Despite the polemics of the political economists and pamphlet writers the 
Old Poor Law seemingly imposed little cost on land owners before 1834.  It had 
no impact on rural wages, and was little barrier to labor mobility.  Nor did it 
increase the fertility of the poor.  The draconian reforms of the New Poor Law, in 
place in England until 1906, and dramatized by Charles Dickens in Oliver Twist in 
1838, had no measurable social benefits.   
 
Over the course of the nineteenth century hundreds of thousands of the 
poor in England were subjected to the harsh regime of the workhouse based on 
the mistaken conclusions of the Political Economists.  Parents were separated   32
from each other and their children, men and women were set to long hours of 
meaningless make work like breaking stones.  The children in laboring families 
with the misfortune to produce large numbers of surviving children were brought 
up in conditions of grinding poverty. 
 
Yet this deliberately induced suffering gained nothing for the land and 
property owners who funded poor relief.  One of the first great triumphs of the 
new discipline of Political Economy, the reform of the Poor Laws, consequently 
had no effects on economic growth and economic performance in Industrial 





Because of the intense public debate about reforming the poor law, the 
English collected a great deal of information about poor payments, population 
and occupations by parish in the years 1825-1842.   
 
For the tests outlined above we measure farmland rents in 1842 from the tax 
valuations for this year of all farmland in a parish (Parliamentary Papers, 1845).  
For properties let within 7 years of the assessment (i.e. 1835-42) the rental value 
was the contracted value.  For properties on longer leases it was the assessed 
market value.  Thus the parish land rents measured in 1842 all stem from the post 
reform period.  We added any tithe payments (also recorded in this source) to the 
rents, so that the 1842 measure is for all rental claims on farmland in the parish.  
Only parishes with more than two-thirds of the property value coming from land 
in 1842 were included so that we are dealing mainly with rural parishes. 
 
To get the rent per acre in 1842 we divide by the land area of the parish.  
Since not all of this parish area was farmland it introduces an error in this 
measurement, which fortunately is on the left hand side of our estimation of 
equation (4).  In some rural parishes a large part of the land was not used for   33
agriculture, being too hilly.  For rural parishes the fraction of the area that was 
actually farmland will correlate with the population density.  So we include 
population density as a control for this measurement error when estimating 
equation (4).  In table 3 the estimated coefficient on population density is 
positive, which is what we would expect from the nature of the measurement 
error. 
 
There is no parish level data available on land rents before the 1834 reform.  
To get rental values in the years before the reform we use data collected by Clark 
on newly formed rents (and tithes) on individual plots within parishes in the years 
1820-1834.
29  From these we estimate parish rental values per acre before the 
reform by adjusting for plot sizes.  Rents per acre tended to be much higher on 
smaller plots.  We adjust land rents to the average plot size that would be 
expected for a parish of that character (based on population density, location, and 
type of agriculture).  In 1820-34 overall farm rents stayed constant (Clark, 2002) 
but in estimating pre-reform parish rents we included year dummies to control for 
such year effects.  From 5,739 plot rentals we estimate 2,207 rural average parish 
land rents per acre.  
 
Though the data comes from very different sources, the parish rent per acre 
for 1820-33 estimated in this way is strongly linked to rents per acre in 1842.  
Thus 
 
Rent20-34  = 1.011       +    0.560rent42 
    (.047)   (.031)   
    
Note that the intercept is greater than 0, and the coefficient on the 1842 rent less 
than 1.  This implies, as we indicate above, significant errors in the later measures 
of rent per acre at the parish level.   
 
                                                 
29 Clark, 2002.   34
  Data is available from the Parliamentary Papers on poor rate collections in 
each of the years 1824-1833, and 1838-41 (Parliamentary Papers, 1830-1, 1835, 
1844).  We average these into poor rate collections in 1824-8, 1829-33, and 1838-
41, and so calculate poor rate payments per head, and poor rate payments per 
acre based on the 1831 and 1841 population totals.  We calculate poor payments 
charged on farmland by multiplying these parish totals by the share of the parish 
property value in 1842 that was land.  We calculate poor payments per acre by 
dividing the totals for the parish by the measured land area of the parish.  This 
would introduce a measurement error which would bias the estimate of b toward 
0, except that we are effectively normalizing on the left hand side of equation (4) 
with the same imperfect measure of farmland area. 
 
We measure the fraction of land which was common property in 1842 using 
parish level data on common land from Tate (1978).  The fraction of common on 
the plots earlier is estimated as discussed in Clark (2002).   
 
The 1831 census supplies information for each parish on the population, the 
number of resident farmers hiring labor, the number of resident farmers not 
hiring labor, and the numbers of agricultural laborers (Parliamentary Papers, 
1833).  We can thus identify rural parishes where most employment in 1831 was 
in agriculture.  We kept in the sample only parishes where agriculture was the 
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